BOOK REVIEW: A Paris lunch, secret letters and Biafra’s 1969 air offensive

A Paris lunch, secret letters and Biafra’s 1969 air offensive. Drawing on unpublished correspondence, Milton Allimadi examines how advance knowledge of a planned military operation tested journalistic judgement during the Nigerian Civil War.
Efe Ogheneboro, a writer and painter writes from Lagos.
In April 1969, a Swedish aviator told an American journalist about a secret military operation over lunch in Paris. Weeks before Biafran aircraft struck Nigerian military installations, senior editors at The New York Times knew what was coming. In his new book, The Day Biafra Died, Milton Allimadi uncovers the correspondence behind an extraordinary episode involving journalism, military secrecy and the Nigerian Civil War.
Published by Black Star Books in September 2026, The Day Biafra Died examines the final phase of the Nigerian Civil War through archival documents from The New York Times, the US State Department, and the White House. Beyond The Secret Air Offensive: Milton Allimadi explores President Richard Nixon’s sympathy for Biafra and the diplomatic decisions that might have altered the war’s outcome.
In April 1969, two men met for lunch in a Paris restaurant. One was Count Carl Gustaf von Rosen, a 60-year-old Swedish aristocrat and veteran aviator. The other was Lloyd McKim Garrison, an American journalist previously expelled from Nigeria for his reporting on the country’s political crisis.
Von Rosen had a secret. He was assembling a small air force to attack Nigerian military installations and challenge the federal government’s overwhelming air superiority over Biafra.
Garrison, a correspondent for The New York Times, was among the first outsiders to learn about the operation.
On April 25, 1969, he wrote to Seymour Topping, the newspaper’s foreign news editor, outlining von Rosen’s plans. The correspondence shows that senior Times editors knew about the proposed Biafran air offensive weeks before the attacks.
More than five decades later, journalist Milton Allimadi reconstructs the encounter in his book, The Day Biafra Died, drawing on Garrison’s unpublished letters and the newspaper’s archival records.
The documents reveal an unusual relationship between a war correspondent, a foreign volunteer fighting for Biafra and an American newspaper entrusted with sensitive military information.
Garrison had arrived in Lagos in 1962 as the Times’ West Africa correspondent. He subsequently covered the political upheavals of 1966, including the massacres of Igbo civilians that preceded Biafra’s declaration of independence in May 1967.
His reporting brought him into conflict with Nigeria’s Federal Military Government, which expelled him in 1967.
He continued reporting from Biafra and developed considerable sympathy for the secessionist republic.
There, he became acquainted with von Rosen, who had participated in dangerous relief flights carrying food and medical supplies into the blockaded territory.
Garrison had accompanied the Swedish pilot on one such mission, establishing a personal relationship that would later give him access to highly confidential information.
By April 1969, Biafra had lost substantial territory. Federal forces controlled major transport routes, while Nigerian military aircraft conducted bombing operations against the secessionist enclave.
Von Rosen believed a small, unconventional air force could disrupt that advantage.
His plan involved five Malmö MFI-9B light aircraft, originally designed as trainers but modified to carry rockets.
Their small size and ability to operate from improvised airstrips made them suitable for surprise attacks.
Rather than engage Nigeria’s Soviet-supplied MiG fighters in aerial combat, von Rosen intended to destroy them on the ground.
He told Garrison that the aircraft and volunteer pilots would reach Biafra around May 21, with operations beginning shortly afterwards.
In his April 25 letter to Topping, Garrison explained:
“The first operation will be a dawn sweep of Nigerian airfields.”
The proposed targets included federal airbases and, potentially, shipping in Lagos harbour.
Von Rosen insisted that the Swedish government was neither involved in nor aware of his plans. His pilots, he said, were volunteers motivated by conviction.
Garrison recognised the significance of the information, describing the proposed attacks as “A significant, if not bizarre, story.”
He began arranging how the Times might secure exclusive coverage.
On April 30, Garrison wrote another letter to Topping confirming that he had received approval to proceed with his reporting arrangements.
He proposed coordinating coverage from both sides of the conflict.
Raymond Walter Apple Jr., the Times’ correspondent in Lagos, could position himself near Benin City, one of the prospective targets. At the same time, Garrison travelled into Biafra to report on von Rosen’s squadron.
Garrison suggested informing Apple that an important development was expected without disclosing the operation itself.
He also proposed coded messages to communicate changes in the attack schedule.
One message, “Please tell parents travel plans firm as scheduled,” would indicate that the operation remained on course.
The plan was given the coded reference “Benin Talker.”
These arrangements demonstrate that the newspaper was preparing to cover an offensive about which its editors possessed advance information.
The correspondence does not establish that the Times helped plan the raids or supplied military intelligence. It does, however, raise questions about the responsibilities of journalists who learn of impending military operations.
Another issue concerned photographs of the proposed attacks.
Garrison informed Topping that a senior Biafran representative had offered exclusive photographic and film rights in exchange for payment.
Garrison was interested, but Topping hesitated.
He feared that paying in advance could amount to financing a military operation.
After consulting managing editor A. M. Rosenthal, Topping instructed Garrison not to enter into an advance purchasing agreement. Photographs could be considered for purchase after the attacks.
Allimadi highlights the contrast between the editors’ concern about financing the operation and how they handled the confidential military information.
The distinction is important. Journalists often receive sensitive information whose premature disclosure could endanger lives. The surviving letters do not establish that the newspaper had an obligation to reveal von Rosen’s plans.
They nevertheless expose the ethical complications arising from Garrison’s personal relationship with the aviator and his sympathy for Biafra.
In late May 1969, von Rosen’s plan became reality.
His squadron, nicknamed the Biafra Babies in memory of children who had died from starvation, launched surprise attacks on Nigerian military installations.
The aircraft struck targets including Port Harcourt and Benin City, reportedly damaging or destroying military aircraft on the ground.
The raids were a psychological victory for Biafra.
Despite the blockade and its deteriorating military position, the republic had demonstrated that it could strike important federal targets.
But the operation could not reverse Nigeria’s overwhelming military advantage.
Five converted trainers were insufficient to overcome Biafra’s shortages of weapons, fuel, workforce and conventional aircraft.
Their achievement was primarily symbolic, boosting morale and attracting international attention.
On May 25, The New York Times published an Associated Press report describing attacks by Swedish aircraft operating for Biafra.
The report attributed its information to Sweden’s Expressen newspaper.
Yet the Times’ internal correspondence showed that its editors had known about the planned offensive since April.
On May 26, Garrison published his own report from Biafra under the headline:
“Swedish Count Describes Bombing Raids for Biafran Air Force.”
He described von Rosen’s aircraft, volunteer pilots and the attacks.
Allimadi questions why the newspaper did not disclose its advance knowledge or secure the exclusive coverage Garrison had anticipated.
The documents do not conclusively explain the editorial decisions.
Security concerns, source protection and operational uncertainty may have influenced the newspaper. What is established is that its editors possessed confidential information about the raids before they occurred.
The von Rosen–Garrison encounter became an important starting point for Allimadi’s investigation into Biafra.
His research into the newspaper’s archives later expanded into American diplomatic records, revealing President Richard Nixon’s private sympathy for Biafra and White House discussions about changing US policy toward the conflict.
But the Paris lunch remains one of the book’s most compelling episodes.
It illustrates how the Nigerian Civil War drew foreign volunteers, journalists and political actors into relationships that sometimes blurred professional boundaries.
Garrison was a correspondent whose access to confidential military information arose partly from his friendship with von Rosen.
The letters do not prove that he participated in planning the attacks. They establish that he knew about them and worked with his editors to prepare coverage.
They also raise a broader question: when journalists become personally sympathetic to a cause they cover, how do they preserve the independence their profession requires?
Biafra eventually collapsed in January 1970. Von Rosen’s improvised air force could not save the republic, and international humanitarian sympathy never produced the decisive intervention its leaders sought.
In April 1969, a Swedish aviator disclosed a secret military plan to an American journalist over lunch in Paris. Weeks later, Nigerian military installations came under attack.
The New York Times had known what was coming.
More than half a century later, the correspondence examined in The Day Biafra Died has brought that extraordinary encounter, and the questions surrounding it, back into the historical record.
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