Ghana’s 2020/2022 debt crisis: Can Akufo-Addo administration be held solely responsible?

By George Domfe, President, Africa Policy Lens I have consistently explained the economic circumstances that culminated in Ghana’s debt crisis, which became particularly acute in 2020. Following substantial debt relief under the Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative, Ghana’s debt position improved considerably, becoming more sustainable from 2005 through 2013 before deteriorating again.

Using the ECOWAS convergence criterion of a debt-to-GDP ratio of 70% as a benchmark, Ghana’s debt ratio exceeded this threshold in 2014, 2015 and 2016. The country subsequently recorded ratios below this benchmark in 2017, 2018 and 2019. The figures even became better after the rebasing in 2018! However, the COVID-19 pandemic and its associated economic disruptions significantly worsened the country’s fiscal position in 2020, contributing to a renewed and severe debt crisis.

Consider the fiscal dynamics of 2020. Actual government revenue fell approximately GH¢11 billion short of the original projection. This substantial shortfall was partly attributable to the pandemic, which disrupted economic activities and reduced revenue from imports and other sources. Simultaneously, government expenditure exceeded the initial budget projection by approximately GH¢19 billion, reflecting, among other factors, extraordinary expenditure pressures associated with the pandemic and the measures required to mitigate its socioeconomic consequences.

The combined effect of revenue shortfalls and expenditure overruns placed considerable pressure on public finances. Ghana’s debt-to-GDP ratio consequently increased from approximately 62.5% in 2019 to 76.1% in 2020, signalling a significant deterioration in the country’s debt position. Subsequent credit-rating downgrades further weakened Ghana’s creditworthiness, restricting access to international capital markets and increasing the cost of external financing.

These developments had serious implications for Ghana’s capacity to meet its external debt obligations, particularly given the country’s historical dependence on international borrowing to refinance maturing obligations and meet other financing requirements. As access to affordable international capital became increasingly constrained, the sustainability of the existing debt structure came under mounting pressure.

The critical question, therefore, is this: Can the Akufo-Addo administration reasonably be held solely responsible for the extraordinary fiscal pressures arising from a global pandemic, the associated revenue shortfalls and the unprecedented expenditure requirements? More importantly, for those who readily attribute the crisis to administrative incompetence, what alternative fiscal and economic policies would they have implemented under comparable circumstances to balance the competing demands of public health, economic recovery, expenditure management and debt sustainability?

This is not to suggest that the administration should be absolved of responsibility for its fiscal decisions or that the pandemic explains every dimension of Ghana’s debt crisis. Rather, a credible assessment must distinguish between pre-existing fiscal vulnerabilities, policy choices made before the pandemic, the direct effects of the external shock and the government’s subsequent responses.

Ghana’s economy has historically been vulnerable to external shocks, persistent fiscal imbalances and structural weaknesses. These vulnerabilities cannot be adequately understood through partisan narratives that isolate particular events from their broader macroeconomic context. A rigorous assessment must examine the trajectory of public debt before 2020, the fiscal consequences of the pandemic and the policy decisions that influenced the country’s subsequent economic outcomes.

Eventually, debt restructuring was undertaken in response to an unsustainable debt position and severely constrained financing options. Although the restructuring imposed substantial costs on affected creditors and created significant challenges for the domestic financial sector, it also provided debt-service relief and fiscal space to support economic adjustment.

Understanding its rationale requires examining both the circumstances that necessitated it and the economic and financial costs associated with its implementation. Ultimately, economic analysis must be grounded in empirical evidence, historical perspective and an appreciation of policy trade-offs. Political arguments that attribute a complex debt crisis to a single administration, without adequately examining the underlying economic conditions, offer an incomplete explanation.

If we genuinely seek to understand Ghana’s debt crisis, we must move beyond partisan blame and critically examine the evidence, the fiscal dynamics, the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, the country’s structural vulnerabilities and the policy choices that shaped the eventual debt restructuring. Economics is a discipline of evidence and analysis, not politica